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INTRODUCTION
The notion of default mode network (DMN) and the dual process theory of thought, topics within
different cognitive neuroscience and psychology subfields, have attracted considerable attention
and been extensively studied in the past decade. The former originated from experimental evidence
on the brain function obtained when an individual is not involved in a specific task, and recent
research suggests that the DMN plays a role in mental and neurological disorders (Buckner et al.,
2008). A distinction is made according to the psychology of thinking in the dual process theory
of thought between fast, effortless associative processes and slow, deliberative ones (Kahneman,
2011). This theory has been exploited both theoretically, to better understand human thought, and
in many applications of behavior modification (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).
This paper proposes that an amalgamation of the aspects of these two topics could be of mutual
benefit to scientists within the respective fields. The discovery of the DMN has stimulated several
hypotheses regarding the neural basis of the self and the theory of the mind. However, with few
exceptions, these hypotheses lack reference to current research on thought processes like reasoning
and decision-making. A role of the DMN in the organization and expression of preplanned,
reflexive behaviors characteristics of fast thinking has beenmentioned by Raichle (2015). Moreover,
a link between fast and slow processes and the activity of neural circuits including the DMN,
has been proposed in the framework of the Predictive And Reactive Control Systems (PARCS)
theory (Tops et al., 2014). More recently, the contribution of the DMN to automated processing
has been also suggested (Vatansever et al., 2017). In contrast, the dual process theory of thought
is the most shared explanation of how thoughts arise but does not adequately address the neural
basis of thought, although an attempt has been made to determine the relationship between ego
depletion and biological parameters (Elkins-Brown et al., 2016). Thus, in our opinion the DMN
may provide a neural foundation for the associative, fast, and effortless form of thinking elucidated
by the dual process theory.
THE DUAL PROCESS THEORY OF THOUGHT
Since the earliest days of philosophical enquiries into the mind, many researchers have entertained
the idea that two different systems of thought co-exist; a quick, automatic, associative, and
affective-based form of reasoning and a slow, thoughtful, deliberative process (Sloman, 1996,
2014; Epstein and Pacini, 1999; Lieberman, 2003; Stanovich, 2004; Kahneman and Frederick,
2005; Evans, 2006). Today, the psychology of thinking calls this idea “the dual process theory of
thought” (Evans, 2003, 2008; Osman, 2004; Evans and Stanovich, 2013), which encompasses a
variety of theories with different approaches to the processes involved in thought. The differences
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are reflected by the terminology. For example, the two co-
existing processes have variously been dubbed System 1 vs.
System 2 (Stanovich, 1999, 2004; Kahneman and Frederick,
2005), intuition vs. deliberation (Sloman, 2014), associative vs.
rule-based thinking (Sloman, 1996), and fast vs. slow thinking
(Kahneman, 2011). Broadly speaking, fast thinking is quick,
effortless, associative and experience-based, and, according to
some authors (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 2014) is organized
in a positive-feedback loop involving affective processes. By
contrast, slow thinking requires effort and the use of cognitive
resources, and is based on symbolic and abstract rule
manipulation.
According to Evans (2007) there are two ways in which the
two processes might interact. Parallel models (Denes-Raj and
Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996) suggest that fast and slow thinking
occur simultaneously (and thus there is a continuous monitoring
and feelings of conflict). In contrast, Default-Interventionist (DI)
models (DeNeys andGlumicic, 2008; Evans and Stanovich, 2013)
claim that fast thinking generates intuitive default responses
in which subsequent slow thinking processing may or may
not serially intervene (provided that adequate resources are
available). However, recent and deeper analysis of the two
models’ assumptions sustains an “hybrid two-stage model” (De
Neys and Glumicic, 2008; Thompson, 2013; Newell et al., 2015)
in which a “shallow analytic monitoring process” is always
active to detect potential conflicts between the two systems,
and an “optional deeper processing stage” is activated once
an actual conflict between fast and slow thinking is found.
Sloman (2014) points out that the distinction between the two
cannot be explained as a simple discrepancy between conscious
and unconscious processes, or between rational and irrational
processes. Indeed, it is possible through introspection to be
conscious of either form of thinking. The difference is that one
can have conscious awareness of the various processing steps
involving in slow thinking, but only the output of the fast
thinking reasoning process. In addition, either thinking modality
can lead to rational or irrational conclusions being drawn. In
particular, with fast thinking, sophisticated causal reasoning
conclusions can be formed, based on normative principles
(Sloman, 2014).
Fast thinking involves conditions of “cognitive ease”
(Kahneman, 1973, 2011), whereby an individual tends to
spontaneously think, choose, and act according to domain-
specific and associative principles in situations that are
easy to understand and process. Thus, inhibition by slow
thinking is unnecessary. Slow thinking requires mental effort
as measured by biological indices, such as pupil dilation
(Kahneman and Beatty, 1966; Kahneman, 2011). Typically,
mental effort is required for tasks requiring attention. Under
these conditions, the individual is subject to a phenomenon
called “ego-depletion:” When forced to do something, he
or she has fewer cognitive resources available to activate
slow thinking and thus it is less able to exert self-control
(Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 1998). However,
a recent meta-analysis (Carter et al., 2015) and a multilab
replication study (Hagger and Chatzisarantis, 2016) challenged
the idea that self-control depends on cognitive resources
limitations. The current debate seems to support a domain-
specific conception of the ego depletion effect that is strongly
affected by individual differences (Dang et al., 2013; Dang,
2016).
THE DEFAULT MODE NETWORK
Twenty years ago, the convergence of much experimental
evidence lent support to the premise that the “resting state” (i.e.,
the baseline task state used as the control in functional magnetic
resonance imaging and positron emission tomography studies)
is spontaneously active during periods of “passivity” (Biswal
et al., 1995; Biswal, 2012; Buckner, 2012; Snyder and Raichle,
2012). The idea of DMN has its roots in the neuroimaging
research revealing task-induced activity decreases from a resting
state in a set of brain regions that were characterized for the
first time by Shulman et al.’s (1997) in a meta-analytic study.
These observations, along with findings reporting high metabolic
activity in these regions at rest (Raichle et al., 2001), led to
the widely acknowledged introduction of the DMN concept
and constituted the first clear evidence of the existence of
a cohesive default mode in the brain (Raichle et al., 2001).
Subsequent studies demonstrated that the main nodes of the
DMN are functionally and structurally connected (Greicius et al.,
2003, 2009). The brain regions involved in the DMN include
the medial prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate cortex,
the inferior parietal lobule, the lateral temporal cortex, the
dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, and the hippocampal formation
(Buckner et al., 2008). The DMN is characterized by lower
activity levels during goal-directed cognition or when a person
is engaged in a particular task requiring externally directed
attention, and higher activity levels when awake and involved
in mental processes requiring low attentional demands. Given
the association between the DMN and states in which thought
is focused on internal channels, the DMN is generally considered
the neural basis of spontaneous cognition (Buckner et al., 2008)
and is responsible for everything that occurs while thinking using
internal representations -including “stream of consciousness”
(daydreaming and memory recall, particularly autobiographical
memory) (James, 1890), envisioning the future, monitoring the
environment, and thinking about others’ intentions.
Spontaneous cognition is receiving increased attention,
motivating researchers to renew previous routes of investigation
and introduce novel methods and experimental paradigms
(Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). An example of such
an experimental paradigm involves the idea of stimulus-
independent thoughts (SITs), which are defined (Buckner et al.,
2008, p. 15) as “thoughts about something other than events
originating from the environment” that are covert and not
directed toward performance of the task at hand According to
Buckner et al. (2008), the most widely used method of evaluating
SITs involves periodically probing trained participants to indicate
whether or not they are experiencing an SIT. SITs have been
researched since the 1960s, albeit under a different classification
(Antrobus, 1968). However, interest in this topic has increased,
which, after the dissemination of the DMN concept, led to
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exploration of the relationship between neural activity and SITs
(McKiernan et al., 2003, 2006) and individual differences (Mason
et al., 2007).
Two main hypotheses have been proposed to explain
DMN function; the internal mentation hypothesis and the
sentinel hypothesis (Buckner et al., 2008). According to the
former, the DMN plays a role in self-referential processes,
i.e., internal mentation about social and emotional content
(Mitchell et al., 2006), mental simulation, theory of mind-related
considerations, and moral decision-making concerning personal
moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001). By contrast, the sentinel
hypothesis claims that the DMN helps to monitor the external
environment (i.e., the direct opposite of focused attention toward
a specific task), fulfilling “the continuous provision of resources
for spontaneous, broad, and exogenously driven information
gathering” (Hahn et al., 2007, p. 10). Very recently, the role
of the DMN was highlighted in automatic behavior (the rapid
selection of a response to a specific and predictable context)
(Vatansever et al., 2017), as opposed to controlled decision-
making, suggesting that the DMN plays a role in the autopilot
mode of brain functioning.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
A few recent papers have begun to connect the two distinct
subfields sketched above, from both a theoretical (Raichle, 2015)
and empirical perspective (Vatansever et al., 2017). Indeed,
several potential similarities exist between the dual-process
theory of thought and the DMN, as illustrated in this paper. For
example, according to the dual process theory of thought, fast
thinking reflects conditions of cognitive ease (Kahneman, 1973,
2011), which is congruent with the premise of “spontaneous
cognition” cited in the DMN literature. Similarly, the cognitive
resources available to monitor the environment (the sentinel
hypothesis) parallel those available in a state of cognitive ease and
are reduced in conditions under which the ego is depleted (dual
process theory). Beyond these general similarities, recent findings
by Vatansever et al. (2017) on the possible role of the DMN as a
neural basis of an autopilot system for human decision-making
reflect the fast thinking-based decision process.
PARCS theory may play a seminal role in integrating
these two subfields since it integrates a dual-process view
similar to that of dual process theory of thought (Carver
et al., 2008) with a cognitive neuroscience framework (Tops
et al., 2010, 2014, 2015, 2017) that already comprises the
DMN for fast processes. Moreover, PARCS theory is also able
to explain the specific contexts in which the ego depletion
effect holds in a way that is compatible with dual process
theories (Tops, 2017). However, there is also evidence of
incongruent features and a lack of correlation between the
two theories—for example, the absence of a clear link between
autobiographical memory (or envisioning the future) and fast
thinking.
Given that the few works have been published on the subject
and the potential similarities between DMN and dual process
theories of thought, we advocate a deeper and more systematic
investigation of the several parallelisms (and limitations) between
the two ideas. DMN function could be better identified using
the well-structured corpus of the dual-process theory of thought,
while the DMN could constitute a potential neural basis for use
in the dual process theory, thus creating a bridge between the
psychology of thinking and neuroscience.
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